Republican presidential candidate Mike Huckabee accused the Bush administration of having an "arrogant bunker mentality" on foreign policy. Secretary Rice responded:

We have right now probably the strongest trans-Atlantic relations ... I would say in a very long time. (...) We're working with allies in Europe, Russia and China on Iran. The (NATO) alliance is mobilized together in Afghanistan.

Phillip Carter over at Intel Dump believes "Condi succumbs to the Kool-Aid:"

Strongest trans-Atlantic relations in a "very long time"? Are you serious? I mean, maybe I'm nostalgic for the good old days of the Marshall Plan and the Berlin Airlift, or even the good old days of the 1980s when NATO stood against the Soviet threat. I wouldn't say our relations with Europe and the world are all that stellar right now. But maybe I'm wrong. Maybe there's some super secret diplomacy going on, and the Germans and French are really our best friends right now. Maybe underneath all that anti-American sentiment and rhetoric on the streets of Europe, they still do think we're that bright shining city on a hill.

I basically agree, except for the last sentence, which is far too black and white, even for provocative closing words. It sounds too much like: You either love us or if you don't, you apparently must hate us. (Related post in the Atlantic Review: The Anti-Americans and the Manichaean Narcissists.)

IMHO Anti-American sentiment on the street should not be used as the main indicator of how good or bad transatlantic relations are. BBQs between our heads of government should not be used as the main indicator either. Instead, all that counts is how well we cooperate regarding Afghanistan, climate change, Middle East, trade, counter-terrorism, Kosovo etc. And here, I believe, cooperation is not as strong as it could and should be.

But, let's face it: Have Europe and the US ever cooperated that much on such a wide range of global issues? During the Cold War transatlantic cooperation was limited to a few policy areas. European and American leaders did not bother themselves with doing something about climate change. NATO did not send 20,000 troops to some far away country.

Today's transatlantic agenda is longer than it ever was before. Perhaps that is what Secretary Rice was referring to. Therefore it is okay, that we do not agree on everything.

The election of new "pro-American" leaders in Europe will not lead to closer and better transatlantic cooperation. Shared values are not enough. Different interests (often based on geographic location) limit the future strength of transatlantic relations.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Editor of The National Interest, in an interview with the Atlantic Community (full disclosure: my day job):

Shared values are an insufficient basis for partnership without compelling shared interests. European states do not have a strong and enduring relationship with like-minded democracies in the Asia-Pacific region, such as Japan or Australia, in the same way that they do with the United States, because Australia and Germany do not have overriding common economic or security interests. Moreover, even when Americans and Europeans agree on the issues, it does not mean that everyone reaches the same conclusions as to what policy is most effective. Other factors beyond shared values, including geographic proximity, can change a country's assessment. Germanys decision to continue to engage Russia and deepen economic ties, or Frances outreach to Libya including new weapons sales fly in the face of American preferences for using isolation and pressure as the main tools to try and effect change. But then again, the United States does not share a neighborhood with these states.

Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, argues in the Financial Times (subscribers only) that "transatlantic cooperation will be less predictable and more selective:"

Alliances require predictability: of threat, outlook and obligations. But it is precisely this characteristic that is likely to be in short supply in a world defined by shifting threats, differing perceptions and societies with widely divergent readiness to maintain and use military force. The 21st-century world is far more dynamic and fluid than the relatively stable and predictable period of the cold war.
This is in no way meant to defend or advocate unilateralism. But it is a recognition that many in Europe disagree with some US objectives, with how the US goes about realising them, or both. As a result, the US often will be unable to count on the support of its traditional allies.
Also weakening Europe's centrality to US foreign policy is that its capacity for global intervention is diminishing, especially in the military field.

Robert Kagan, however, is more optimistic about transatlantic cooperation, or more specifically: cooperation between democracies. He sees a tendency towards solidarity among the world's autocracies as well as among the world's democracies. Summary of his arguments is available at "The World Divided Between Autocracy and Democracy" on Atlantic Community.

"The rise of external threats to our allies has concentrated their minds on the need for the American connection," says Charles Krauthammer, whose Washington Post column takes issue with the claims by Democratic presidential candidates that US allies are alienated and that alliances need to be rebuild.

Krauthammer seems to be very impressed by the nice things European leaders say about the United States and ignores that the new crop of European leaders has not increased support for US led missions: While the US has send additional troops to Iraq (and Afghanistan, I believe), Britain has withdrawn many troops. And the new and supposedly pro-American governments in France and Germany are not sending more troops to Afghanistan etc. And NATO can't get together its planned Rapid Reaction Force.

It seems Krauthammer does not expect much from allies. All they (we) got to do is to say nice things about the United States. Military contributions would be nice, but are not so important. Smiling is more important.

The one thing a loyal ally should never do is to express public criticism of US policies and the president. If we manage that, then folks like Krauthammer will love us. If we manage to smile and be as polite as Japanese politicians, then we could even get US support for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. The German government's calls for a permanent German seat on the Security Council fly in the face of reality and I understand why the US is not supporting the German ambitions. But why is the US supporting the Japanese ambitions in this regard? How many Japanese troops are taking risks in Afghanistan, Timor Leste, Iraq, Kosovo or Sudan? The difference to Germany is that Japan, usually agrees with US policies. Apparently Washington has a soft spot for compliments and moral support... And yes, of course, Europe is overrepresented on the Security Council, while Asia is not.

Related Atlantic Review post: Better Transatlantic Relations in Style, not Substance

Related op-ed on Atlantic Community by Nikolas K. Gvosdev, editor-in-chief of The National Interest: Time for Frank Talk on US-EU Relations.

ENDNOTE: I read that "How To"-posts are extremely popular in the blogosphere. Therefore I chose this headline. ;-) If you indeed like this post, please recommend it at Reddit and Stumble Upon. If you have not registered at these social bookmarking services yet, then you can sign up in a few seconds at Reddit; no email adress needed. Stumble Upon is pretty cool as well.
 

"Helmut Schmidt, the former German chancellor who initiated the US arms buildup against the Soviet Union during his term in office, considers today's Russia to be less dangerous than the United States. This is as surprising as it is provocative," writes Gabor Steingart in Spiegel International and criticizes this analysis. Here is the quote from Schmidt:

Russia poses far less of a threat to world peace today than, for example, the United States. You can go ahead and print that.

Personal comments: I am surprised and disappointed that so many Social Democrats are not concerned about the developments in Russia. It's not just Schmidt, but also Germany's Foreign Minister Steinmeier. And ex-chancellor Schroeder, who is on Gazprom's payroll, criticized Merkel's Russia policy...

The picture shows from left to right Richard von Weizsäcker, Ronald Reagan and Helmut Schmidt on 11. June 1982 near Checkpoint Charlie.

According to Henry Kissinger, the real transatlantic difference is that "European governments are not able any more to ask their people for great sacrifices." That's why Europe readily opts for a "soft power" approach to so many foreign policy issues. This will, of necessity, make it harder for Europe to reach a consensus with the U.S.

Asked whether "an all-out effort to restore the Cold War-era level of trans-Atlantic comity within NATO, would be a good investment for the U.S.", Mr. Kissinger expressed skepticism regarding the prospects for success. Kissinger's views on diplomacy in the post 9/11 era are described in a Wall Street Journal article (HT: Joe) by David Rivkin, a lawyer based in Washington, who served in the Justice Department under Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush.

Are the differences between Americans and Europeans regarding sacrifice really that big? Germany is certainly a post-heroic society. The Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences has even a research procejt on "Armed forces in a post-heroic society." Though, isn't America quickly moving towards a post-heroic society as well? Compared to WWII or Vietnam the casualties in Iraq are pretty small, but the calls for withdrawal are already very loud.

President Sarkozy gets a dozen standing ovations from Congress. And Chancellor Merkel gets to stay at Bush's ranch in Crawford, which is supposed to be some high honor bestowed upon only President Bush's very best allies.

Will this charm offensive result in better transatlantic relations?

I seriously doubt that Merkel feels all warm and fuzzy now, although that seems to have been the purpose of the invite to Crawford. Likewise, I doubt whether ex-Chancellor Schroeder was saddened when President Bush gave him the cold shoulder treatment. I think the White House exaggerates the power of such symbolism. European politicians are not going to be more supportive of the US because of a visit to Crawford or standing ovations. Has the charming worked in the US? Le Figaro (translation at TMV) opines that Sarkozy accomplished his goal of "conquering the hearts of Americans." Apparently, it is not so difficult to impress Americans these days:
Continue reading "Better Transatlantic Relations in Style, not Substance"

The ascensions of Ms. Merkel and, particularly, Mr. Sarkozy have been heralded by American conservatives, who see their victories as evidence that anti-Americanism is neither as widespread nor as trenchant among Europeans as some have suggested. After all, they argue, didn't Mr. Sarkozy's detractors label him 'Sarko the American', and did he not win over French voters regardless?

Mr. Sarkozy's victory, Fred Thompson said in an ABC radio commentary, "has been a serious blow to those who claim that America has earned the undying hatred of Europeans. A French president who openly admires America is an embarrassment to those who view us as the country bumpkin cousins of the sophisticated Europeans." The New York Sun put things even more colorfully in an editorial: "How are all those Democratic Party, pinky-in-the-air U.N. admirers who wailed about Mr. Bush's alienating of Europe going to explain this turn of events?" it gloated.

It is not quite as simple as that. For a start, it takes a robust sense of self-importance to assume that national elections on the other side of the Atlantic are nothing more than referenda on relations with America. In fact, the French and German elections were largely decided by domestic issues. In both cases, a moribund economy and a general sense of dissatisfaction with the status quo fuelled the victories of candidates whose pro-free market reform credentials were more important than their pro-Americanism.