Why is Afghanistan a narco-state? Ambassador Thomas Schweich left the State Department in June and is now at liberty to identify the "cabal":

An odd cabal of timorous Europeans, myopic media outlets, corrupt Afghans, blinkered Pentagon officers, politically motivated Democrats and the Taliban were preventing the implementation of an effective counterdrug program. And the rest of us could not turn them around.

Wow, what a cabal! Only Sean Penn is missing in that list of usual suspects.

Thomas Schweich used to be the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and pressed hard for aerial eradication to wipe out the poppy production in Afghanistan. He considers eradication "an essential component of successful anti-poppy efforts in Guatemala, Southeast Asia and Pakistan."

His 5,500 words long essay in the New York Times Magazine describes in great detail his frustration with the widespread opposition to aerial eradication. The essay's title is "Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?" but deals mainly with the many disagreements within the US government (and with NATO allies).

Schweich blames mainly the Pentagon for lack of understanding and the British military for lack of loyalty:

Javier Solana, the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and a Spanish Fulbright Alumnus, said according to AFP that he backed the new Pakistani government's moves to hold talks with Taliban militants, but ruled out any negotiations with Al-Qaeda.

This puts Europe at odds with the United States, not just with the Bush administration, but also with all remaining presidential candidates. Even Barack Obama, who is willing to meet with Iran's President Ahmadinejad, seems to be against negotiations with Taliban. He wrote in Foreign Affairs last summer:

Our strategy must also include sustained diplomacy to isolate the Taliban and more effective development programs that target aid to areas where the Taliban are making inroads.

I agree with Niklas Keller, who argued in the Atlantic Community that "negotiations with the Taliban may be the West's most effective tool to successfully 'divide and conquer' the Afghani insurgency."