General John Craddock, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe for NATO, got pretty outspoken about internal and external challenges in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Speaking at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) on October 20, 2008, General Craddock even raised the issue of NATO's relevancy:

A brief look at the will of our alliance in the mission in Afghanistan demonstrates some real shortcomings. In view of the more than 70 national operational restrictions, or 'caveats', and our continual inability to fill our agreed-upon statement of requirements in theatre, we are demonstrating a political will that is somewhat wavering. And it is this wavering political will that impedes operational progress and brings into question the relevancy of the Alliance here in the 21st century.´

Craddock made some good, but hardly surprising suggestions about funding and speeding up the decision-making processes. You can start the debate over at Atlantic Community: How to Keep NATO Relevant?

Atlantic Community is now addressing Afghanistan as a focus topic and also features an article by Morgan Sheeran, veteran of the US Armed Forces with 26 years of service including a tour in Afghanistan: Afghan Surge: More Police Trainers Essential. The first comment below that article is from Florian Broschk, who has been serving four tours with ISAF in Afghanistan. He also taught Dari (the second most popular language in Afghanistan) to Bundeswehr soldiers.

In his nomination speech, the Democratic presidential candidate reiterates his commitment to direct diplomacy with Iran and his hawkish position on Pakistan, which I describe at Atlantic-Community.org. I am also asking whether Obama is an Atlanticist and look forward to your views on Germany's security policy of free-riding.

Last week Kyle wrote in War for Dummies: Step 1, Fighting Is Necessary about Secretary Gates' frustration with some European allies, who are not committing combat troops to southern Afghanistan.

I understand and respect the criticism, but fighting is really just step 1 in Afghanistan. Some US commanders in Afghanistan have moved on to step 2 in the handbook, which says that fighting is a distraction.

Economist describes how the "mistakes of the past six years of fighting in Afghanistan" have changed the "mindset of American military commanders:"

They now regard kinetic actions (ie, fighting) as a distraction, a preliminary shaping operation at best. The decisive operation is non-kinetic, says Colonel Martin Schweitzer, commander of Task Force Fury, responsible for six south-eastern provinces. His focus is training Afghan forces, building roads, schools and clinics and, above all, getting the government to start addressing the needs of the people.

He has schooled himself in the ways of Pushtunwali, the Pushtun tribal code of honour, and has its main tenets on his wall. Next door to his office, a group of anthropologists and sociologists known as the human-terrain team provides him with valuable intelligence, not on the enemy but on the society in which they mingle. Colonel Schweitzer says what he needs is not more troops but more non-uniformed instruments of power: diplomatic, information and economic, especially agronomists and water engineers.

The Economist article is pretty good and notes US successes in Afghanistan, incl. reconstruction and reconciliation. The Atlantic Review already wrote about Colonel Schweitzer's collaboration with anthropologists in The Pentagon's Embedded Scholars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Related posts: Germans to the Front! and A Shared Mission in Afghanistan?