Posted by Nanne Zwagerman in
European Issues, US Foreign Policy on Friday, August 15. 2008
On the Cato at Liberty blog, Benjamin H. Friedman notes that many commentators fatally misunderstand Russian foreign policy, due to an excessive focus on the intentions of the current government:
Commentators of all stripes seem to assume that Russia’s move into Georgia was driven by its increasingly autocratic nature. [...] It is worth considering whether this is a misperception. A powerful body of political science argues that states’ foreign policy actions are driven mostly by their circumstance and interests, not their regime type or the personality of the leaders. Regime type and personality affect how states interpret their circumstances, but maybe not as much as we tend to think. The United States is not particularly tolerant of seemingly hostile states in its near abroad either, whether they are democracies or not.
Continue reading "Russian Interests"
Posted by Kyle Atwell in
European Issues, Transatlantic Relations, US Foreign Policy on Wednesday, August 13. 2008
A poll by Opinion Research Corporation finds a strong majority of Americans support missile defense, as reported by Market Watch:
A national poll released today revealed that 87 percent of the American Public believes that the United States should have a missile defense system. The public survey showed that 58% of the American Public thinks that there is a real threat from missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction and that missile defense is the preferred option over pre-emptive military action or diplomatic efforts for dealing with the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction by nation states.
This is an astonishingly high number considering the broad opposition to missile defense in Europe, and the reluctance to embrace it by several leading Democrats, including Barack Obama.
It will be interesting to see if Russia’s intervention into Georgia will increase or decrease European support for US systems. Initial reports suggest Russia’s actions have provoked a renewed sense of urgency into recently stagnant negotiations between Poland and the United States. According to the Financial Times:
Talks on building part of a US missile defence shield on Polish soil restarted on Wednesday, with Polish officials sending much more positive signals than recently, in part because of fears awakened by the Russian attack on Georgia.
The fighting between Russia and Georgia appears to have made the benefits of having a permanent US troop presence on Polish soil more apparent to Warsaw. US negotiators are also interested in strengthening security ties with Poland.
Talks stalled over Polish demands that the US beef up Polish domestic defenses, including with expensive Patriot interceptors, in order to place US missile defense systems on Polish territory. However, Polish political leaders argue that Russia’s intervention against Georgia has provided substance to its demands, as reported by the Associated Press:
Prime Minister Donald Tusk said Tuesday the attacks in Georgia justified Poland's demand for additional security guarantees if it accepts a U.S. installation.
"The increase in international tension that we are dealing with now, but which we had not expected, makes the security guarantees ... an issue even more important than before," [Polish Foreign Minister] Sikorski said.
Russia has strongly opposed US missile defense systems based in Poland and the Czech Republic, which it sees as a security threat. It is interesting that Russia's incursion into Georgia has emboldened Poland and the United States to push forward with missile defense plans, rather than making them “think twice” before moving ahead with the controversial project.
Posted by Joerg Wolf in
European Issues, US Foreign Policy on Monday, August 11. 2008
The Georgian government is recalling its 2,000 troops serving in Iraq to confront the threat at home, reports The Times: We helped in Iraq - now help us, beg Georgians As Russia forces its neighbour to retreat from South Ossetia, the people of Gori tell our correspondent of betrayal by the West. (...)
Miriyan Gogolashvili, of Tkviav, said: "The Russians will be here tomorrow. They want to show us and the world how powerful they are. Tomorrow it will be Ukraine and nobody in the West is doing anything to stop them. Why were our soldiers in Kosovo and Iraq if we don't get any help from the West now?" he asked. So, is the West going to defend Georgia? Nobody seriously expect the EU to fight the Russians, after all we Europeans are from Venus. So what about the Americans from Mars? Is the United States going to help Georgia fight the Russians? After all, the US was Georgia's strongest supporter for NATO membership action plans...
Continue reading "Georgians: We Helped you in Iraq, now Help us!"
Posted by Editors in
European Issues on Sunday, August 10. 2008
South Ossetia might well become Georgia's Chechnya. And the European Union might be the best-placed conflict manager in the South Caucasus, concludes Professor Stefan Wolff from the University of Nottingham in this guest article for Atlantic Review:
 As fighting in the separatist region of South Ossetia in Georgia escalates, with Russian air force attacking military targets inside Georgia and Abkhazian rebels in another break-away region of Georgia launching attacks against Georgian military installations, the South Caucasus seems on the brink of a major military confrontation between Georgia and Russia and its allies. The current hostilities are the culmination so far of increasing belligerence on all sides over the past 4 years. With both conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia unresolved but quiet since the early 1990s, it was only when current Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili came to power in 2004 that things began to heat up.
Continue reading "What to Expect from the Georgia-Russia Crisis"
Posted by Editors in
Transatlantic Relations on Tuesday, August 5. 2008
This is a guest blog post by Pat Patterson:
While much of the West is hyperventilating over whether they even need NATO the Russians have announced a series of military procurements and strategic plans that will force European governments to confront not only a larger Russian land force but also its promise to construct a deep water navy of at least six carrier battle groups. Simon Tisdall has written an article recommending a "coherent" European defense system in reaction to the realities of this new well-funded Russian strategic plan. Tisdall argues that Europe will be the main loser, rarely mentioning the US at all, if they do not take steps now to confront a problem that might be overwhelming in a decade. Much of his article is based on a much longer report (pdf) by Nick Witney of the European Council on Foreign Relations. But beware the Witney article, or rather report, is over 78 pages and sometimes lapses into defense jargon.
What is unusual is that Witney and Tisdall maintain that the EU and I would assume NATO does not need to increase spending but rather not waste what it does spend. That seems like a good idea but oftentimes armies get what the contractors can build rather than what the military asks for. The onus is placed squarely on the European nations to solve this problem and gain some independence from a reliance on the US to foot the bill. Tisdall does conclude that so far American criticism of the European defense posture has been ".benign" but that might well be due to American disappointment over some nation's skirting of its perceived treaty obligations in Afghanistan and thus a desire not to further roil European sensibilities. However both Tisdall and Witney hint that while the US is still saying pretty please in public its private conversations could become much more forceful and unpalatable.
Posted by Kyle Atwell in
European Issues, Transatlantic Relations on Friday, May 16. 2008
Observing Hermann has posted a revealing article that references the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) most recent survey on global arms transfers (HT: Joe Noory):
The survey says that the USA, Russia and Germany are the world’s leading weapons exporters, with Germany’s latest weapons export piece of the pie profits coming in at around $3.395 billion. Damn, just think of all the ploughshares you could buy with that.
Taking a look at the numbers more closely reveals some interesting facts:
 In 2007:
• The USA, Russia, and Germany held 31, 19, and 14 percent of global exports respectively
• France was the fourth largest arms exporter, with 11% of the global market
From 2006 to 2007:
• Russia’s market share dropped 25% to 19%
• Germany’s market share rose 11% to 14%
• France’s market share rose 6% to 11%
The chart above shows Germany's global arms exports have increased steadily over the past few years. This is interesting considering Germany's resistance to take on an active combat role in Afghanistan, instead preferring to focus on reconstruction projects. As Observing Hermann wryly states:
All I can say is that it’s good to know that all of these German weapons are being used for goodness and niceness and purely defensive purposes (did you know that Wehrmacht meant defensive force?), not like some other countries’ weapons out there, if you know what I’m sayin’. Otherwise a whole lot of people in this country wouldn’t be able to sleep well at night.
Related posts on Atlantic Review:
• Afghanistan: Merkel has “No Time” for Burden Sharing Proposals
• Afghanistan: NATO Crisis Gets Worse
• War for Dummies: Step 1, Fighting is Necessary
• Afghanistan: Fighting is Not Most Important
Posted by Kyle Atwell in
European Issues, Transatlantic Relations, US Foreign Policy on Saturday, May 10. 2008
Tiny Georgia has become the front line in West-Russia tensions for the past month. It began at the NATO Bucharest Summit in early April, when NATO members rebuked immediate progress toward full NATO membership for Georgia, due largely to protests from Russia – while nonetheless promising future membership.
In the month since Bucharest, Russia-Georgia relations have spiraled quickly. Multiple Georgian unmanned aircraft are claimed to have been shot down over the breakaway region of Abkhazia, though disinformation (i.e. – blatant lies) coming from Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia, or all three, have blurred the facts. Russia has also deepened ties with Georgia’s separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and increased its number of “peace-keepers” there despite protests from the EU and NATO. At the same time, Russia is accusing Georgia of preparing an invasion into Abkhazia, and Georgia has pulled out of an air-defense treaty with Russia.
While both Russia and Georgia are contributing to escalating tensions, Russia undoubtedly initiated the latest downturn as a response to Georgia's bid for NATO membership.
Continue reading "Georgia Conflict: Should NATO Marry the Small Kid on the Playground?"
Posted by Nanne Zwagerman in
Transatlantic Relations on Sunday, March 23. 2008
Senator and presumptive Republican presidential nominee John McCain has repeated his calls for a 'league of democracies' in a Financial Times op-ed directed at Europe.
We need to renew and revitalise our democratic solidarity. We need to strengthen our transatlantic alliance as the core of a new global compact – a League of Democracies – that can harness the great power of the more than 100 democratic nations around the world to advance our values and defend our shared interests.
At the heart of this new compact must be mutual respect and trust. We Americans recall the words of our founders in the Declaration of Independence, that we must pay “decent respect to the opinions of mankind”. Our great power does not mean we can do whatever we want whenever we want, nor should we assume we have all the wisdom and knowledge necessary to succeed.
The words about respect and trust are welcome. However, the idea of a leage of democracies is also likely to run into some opposition among America's European allies. The reasons McCain gives for his league of democracies, both in the FT and in a May 2007 speech reported on in the Washington Post, have much to do with America's perceived national interest. On issues like confronting the 'turn towards autocracy' in Russia, 'acting where the UN fails to act' on a problem like Darfur and providing 'unimpeded market access' to open market democracies, continental Europe has completely different perceived interests.
Continue reading "John McCain's League of Democracies"
Posted by Joerg Wolf in
Transatlantic Relations on Thursday, March 20. 2008
At my day job at Atlantic Community, we have published quite a few interesting articles on US-Polish issues. Polish perspectives are under-reported in the German and American mass media, but they are important because Poland is one of Europe's bigger countries, is considered very Pro-American and was seen as the primary "New Europe" country, a term that is less frequently used these days, but is still controversial.
Marek Swierczynski, a journalist at the Polish TV channel TVP, reflects on the fifth anniversary of the Iraq war:
Poland's decision to join the "coalition of the willing" has left the military stretched beyond capacity, the society in serious mistrust of their leaders and perception of a joint effort for a good cause seriously damaged. It took 25 lives 5 years and 3 governments to rethink and withdraw.
Ryan R. Miller of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) in Washington, DC. writes about Poland's Iran Option:
Possible Polish-Iranian energy cooperation puts U.S. policy makers between a rock and a hard place, as America finds itself committed both to isolating the Islamic Republic and supporting Polish efforts to outflank Russia's Gazprom.
Wess Mitchell, who is the Director of Research at CEPA, outlines recent developments between the United States and Poland regarding the US missile defense program. He concludes that relations between Poland and Russia are likely to deteriorate and Tusk may have compromised himself by acting so decisively this early in his term: Missile Defense: Poland Has Less Room to Maneuver.
Anna Nadgrodkiewicz sums up contentious issues in Polish-American relations: Polish troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, the necessity of easing visa requirements, and the proposed missile defense shield. See her article Managing Image and Expectations.
Marek Swierczynski sees NATO at a Crossroad in a second article:
Just before the NATO summit in Bucharest, the differences on what and how the Alliance should do in the future seem all but rising on both sides of the Atlantic. The Warsaw conference on NATO's Transformation made fundamental divides clearly visible. (...) The new NATO members seem to live in a Neverland. Professor Kuzniar assessed that the Alliance is the only force of global reach and capabilities. Wrong. There is no such thing as NATO global capability. There is the US global capability and to be more precise it is one of the US Navy.
Posted by Editors in
German Politics, International Economics on Saturday, March 1. 2008
David Francis, an American reporter traveling through Europe to report on EU energy security issues, notes that Germans are not concerned about dependence on Russian energy. He wrote the following guest blog post and asks Atlantic Review's readers why Schroeder got away with the Nord Stream deal:
I've been in Berlin for the last week, interviewing German officials about the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline, more commonly know here as the Baltic Sea pipeline. For those who aren't familiar, the pipeline is controversial for a number of reasons. First, it makes Germany heavily dependent on Russia's state-controlled energy monopoly Gazprom, a firm that in the past has been accused of playing "pipeline politics." But the main controversy surrounding the deal, in Germany at least, centered on former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who pushed hard for the deal before leaving office, only to be named chief of Nord Stream's shareholder's committee after leaving office. This position pays quite a large paycheck.
Continue reading "In Berlin, Outrage Over Nord Stream Deal Seems to Have Died"
Posted by Kyle Atwell in
European Issues on Friday, February 22. 2008
The Moscow News Weekly has published an article on Kosovo's declaration of independence, which from its tone I assumed was in the "Comment/Opinions" section. However, it turns out it was actually in the "World News" section. Here is a snippet:
While burning KFOR checkpoints may not be the best of ways for Kosovo's ethnic Serbian minority to express its anxiety and anger over recent events, global democratic leaders should think twice before voting to award a chair to Kosovo on New York's East River. In the Basque country, Quebec, Belgium, northern Cyprus, Georgia and many other places across the globe, they have TV sets, too, and are watching. Telling them Kosovo is different and unique won't work. That's the price you pay for being a hypocrite, I guess.
Not to say western newspapers are completely objective, but at least you can read multiple perspectives on a story on this side of the Urals, without worrying about whether your favorite columnist may mysteriously die one day.
Of course this is only one article in one newspaper; it may not be fair to judge the entire Russian media based on this article alone. To get a better idea of press freedom trends globally and by country, you can check out an annual report produced by Freedom House titled "Freedom of the Press." The 2007 version reported this for Russia:
Media freedom in Russia continued to be curtailed in 2006 as President Vladimir Putin’s government passed legislation restricting news reporting and journalists were subjected to physical violence and intimidation. Although the constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press, authorities are able to use the legislative and judicial systems to harass and prosecute independent journalists.
Posted by Kyle Atwell in
European Issues, Transatlantic Relations on Friday, February 8. 2008
Ronald Asmus has a new “grand strategy” for the west: it should continue to expand eastward (see Foreign Affairs, subscription only):
The challenge of securing Europe’s eastern border from the Baltics to the Black Sea has been replaced by the need to extend peace and stability along the southern rim of the Euro-Atlantic community—from the Balkans across the Black Sea and further into Eurasia, a region that connects Europe, Russia, and the Middle East and involves core security interests, including a critical energy corridor. Working to consolidate democratic change and build stability in this area is as important for Western security today as consolidating democracy in central and eastern Europe was in the 1990s.
The west’s most important accomplishment following the Cold War has been its integration of central and eastern European countries that were previously part of the Soviet Union—countries that have undergone significant reforms to be accepted into NATO and the EU. It is interesting that despite the ubiquitous negative publicity NATO is receiving these days, due largely to a perceived lack of teamwork in Afghanistan, there are several countries that continue to fervently seek membership—take the 71 percent of Georgian’s who endorsed NATO membership in a January referendum for example (see Today’s Zaman).
Continue reading "Ronald Asmus' Strategy for the West: Expand East"
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