"The rise of external threats to our allies has concentrated their minds on the need for the American connection," says Charles Krauthammer, whose Washington Post column takes issue with the claims by Democratic presidential candidates that US allies are alienated and that alliances need to be rebuild.

Krauthammer seems to be very impressed by the nice things European leaders say about the United States and ignores that the new crop of European leaders has not increased support for US led missions: While the US has send additional troops to Iraq (and Afghanistan, I believe), Britain has withdrawn many troops. And the new and supposedly pro-American governments in France and Germany are not sending more troops to Afghanistan etc. And NATO can't get together its planned Rapid Reaction Force.

It seems Krauthammer does not expect much from allies. All they (we) got to do is to say nice things about the United States. Military contributions would be nice, but are not so important. Smiling is more important.

The one thing a loyal ally should never do is to express public criticism of US policies and the president. If we manage that, then folks like Krauthammer will love us. If we manage to smile and be as polite as Japanese politicians, then we could even get US support for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. The German government's calls for a permanent German seat on the Security Council fly in the face of reality and I understand why the US is not supporting the German ambitions. But why is the US supporting the Japanese ambitions in this regard? How many Japanese troops are taking risks in Afghanistan, Timor Leste, Iraq, Kosovo or Sudan? The difference to Germany is that Japan, usually agrees with US policies. Apparently Washington has a soft spot for compliments and moral support... And yes, of course, Europe is overrepresented on the Security Council, while Asia is not.

Related Atlantic Review post: Better Transatlantic Relations in Style, not Substance

Related op-ed on Atlantic Community by Nikolas K. Gvosdev, editor-in-chief of The National Interest: Time for Frank Talk on US-EU Relations.

ENDNOTE: I read that "How To"-posts are extremely popular in the blogosphere. Therefore I chose this headline. ;-) If you indeed like this post, please recommend it at Reddit and Stumble Upon. If you have not registered at these social bookmarking services yet, then you can sign up in a few seconds at Reddit; no email adress needed. Stumble Upon is pretty cool as well.
 

"Helmut Schmidt, the former German chancellor who initiated the US arms buildup against the Soviet Union during his term in office, considers today's Russia to be less dangerous than the United States. This is as surprising as it is provocative," writes Gabor Steingart in Spiegel International and criticizes this analysis. Here is the quote from Schmidt:

Russia poses far less of a threat to world peace today than, for example, the United States. You can go ahead and print that.

Personal comments: I am surprised and disappointed that so many Social Democrats are not concerned about the developments in Russia. It's not just Schmidt, but also Germany's Foreign Minister Steinmeier. And ex-chancellor Schroeder, who is on Gazprom's payroll, criticized Merkel's Russia policy...

The picture shows from left to right Richard von Weizsäcker, Ronald Reagan and Helmut Schmidt on 11. June 1982 near Checkpoint Charlie.

According to Henry Kissinger, the real transatlantic difference is that "European governments are not able any more to ask their people for great sacrifices." That's why Europe readily opts for a "soft power" approach to so many foreign policy issues. This will, of necessity, make it harder for Europe to reach a consensus with the U.S.

Asked whether "an all-out effort to restore the Cold War-era level of trans-Atlantic comity within NATO, would be a good investment for the U.S.", Mr. Kissinger expressed skepticism regarding the prospects for success. Kissinger's views on diplomacy in the post 9/11 era are described in a Wall Street Journal article (HT: Joe) by David Rivkin, a lawyer based in Washington, who served in the Justice Department under Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush.

Are the differences between Americans and Europeans regarding sacrifice really that big? Germany is certainly a post-heroic society. The Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences has even a research procejt on "Armed forces in a post-heroic society." Though, isn't America quickly moving towards a post-heroic society as well? Compared to WWII or Vietnam the casualties in Iraq are pretty small, but the calls for withdrawal are already very loud.

President Sarkozy gets a dozen standing ovations from Congress. And Chancellor Merkel gets to stay at Bush's ranch in Crawford, which is supposed to be some high honor bestowed upon only President Bush's very best allies.

Will this charm offensive result in better transatlantic relations?

I seriously doubt that Merkel feels all warm and fuzzy now, although that seems to have been the purpose of the invite to Crawford. Likewise, I doubt whether ex-Chancellor Schroeder was saddened when President Bush gave him the cold shoulder treatment. I think the White House exaggerates the power of such symbolism. European politicians are not going to be more supportive of the US because of a visit to Crawford or standing ovations. Has the charming worked in the US? Le Figaro (translation at TMV) opines that Sarkozy accomplished his goal of "conquering the hearts of Americans." Apparently, it is not so difficult to impress Americans these days:
Continue reading "Better Transatlantic Relations in Style, not Substance"

The ascensions of Ms. Merkel and, particularly, Mr. Sarkozy have been heralded by American conservatives, who see their victories as evidence that anti-Americanism is neither as widespread nor as trenchant among Europeans as some have suggested. After all, they argue, didn't Mr. Sarkozy's detractors label him 'Sarko the American', and did he not win over French voters regardless?

Mr. Sarkozy's victory, Fred Thompson said in an ABC radio commentary, "has been a serious blow to those who claim that America has earned the undying hatred of Europeans. A French president who openly admires America is an embarrassment to those who view us as the country bumpkin cousins of the sophisticated Europeans." The New York Sun put things even more colorfully in an editorial: "How are all those Democratic Party, pinky-in-the-air U.N. admirers who wailed about Mr. Bush's alienating of Europe going to explain this turn of events?" it gloated.

It is not quite as simple as that. For a start, it takes a robust sense of self-importance to assume that national elections on the other side of the Atlantic are nothing more than referenda on relations with America. In fact, the French and German elections were largely decided by domestic issues. In both cases, a moribund economy and a general sense of dissatisfaction with the status quo fuelled the victories of candidates whose pro-free market reform credentials were more important than their pro-Americanism.

Viola Herms Drath writes about some kind of new Atlanticism in The Washington Times (via James Joyner in Outside the Beltway):

The dawn of a New Alanticism comes as a welcome surprise. After years of benign neglect, European leaders who are energetic and emancipated Atlanticists in Germany, France and England are ready to shoulder new responsibilities outside their borders. Based on their appraisal of terrorist threats and the Middle East quagmire as immediate danger to world peace and Western civilization, these newly elected politicians are shifting political gears. Activated by the number of mosques rising on their soils, failing integration policies and the radicalization of young Muslims, leaders in the three major European nations promise, at long last, new geostrategic horizons benefiting partners on both sides of the Atlantic: a New Atlanticism - reviving the spirit of the West.

I am skeptical whether there will be that much more transatlantic cooperation and less disagreements on crucial security issues, but I like the author's use of the term "emancipated Atlanticists," which gives a realistic understanding of recent changes.

Though, I strongly disagree with Viola Herms Drath's assessment that that the increase in mosques has "activated" this spirit of Atlanticism in Germany, France and Britain. Perhaps the author hopes that (radical) Islam will serve as the new enemy that unites the West as the Soviet Union has done in the past. It's not gonna happen. A rising number of mosques in Europe will not convince any European government to send troops to Iraq or support air strikes on Iran or promise any other "new geostrategic horizons."

Europeans can learn a lot from Americans about how to integrate people with diverse backgrounds and religions, but that has nothing to do with Atlanticism.

Opinion polls cite widespread dismay with the Iraq war, our dog-eat-dog social model and the arrogance of an imperial superpower that places itself above international law. But behind the surveys about "why they hate us" lies a reservoir of goodwill waiting to be tapped among foreigners who would prefer to see the United States succeed rather than fail. This love-hate melange has perpetuated four modern myths about transatlantic relations that deserve to be debunked.
1. The French hate us:
There is scant evidence to suggest that exploiting anti-American attitudes wins elections. During the French campaign, Sarkozy was often derided by his Socialist opponents as "an American neoconservative carrying a French passport." (...) In Germany, where anti-American views have hardened in recent years, Merkel has not suffered because of her support of the United States. Indeed, she has steadily increased her popularity with high-profile visits to Washington. (...)
2. Europeans look down on the American way of life:
Young Europeans are more eager than ever to work and study in the United States. A brain drain from France and Germany has sent some of their best and brightest to the United States. (...) When I spoke last year with about 50 Germans studying at MIT and Harvard, not one of them expressed a desire to return home. They all wanted to live and work in the United States, where, they said, opportunities are far more abundant.
3. "Old Europe" no longer matters because China and India are the future:
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Europe supposedly lost its relevance. Not true. In fact, Europe and the United States still act as the twin turbines of the global economy, accounting for 60 percent of all trade and investment flows. Americans invested five times as much money in Germany last year as they did in China, and U.S. firms in total have poured four times as much money into tiny Belgium as they have into India. Europe provides three-quarters of all foreign investment in the United States, creating millions of American jobs.
4. Europe loves only Democrats:
Most Europeans loathe George W. Bush, and his departure from the White House will be cheered in capitals around the world. But that doesn't mean that Europeans want a return to the kumbaya-ism and humility evinced by President Jimmy Carter and the early years of the Clinton administration, when the United States failed to lead in stopping genocide in the Balkans.

The Russia we face today is a different one than what we hoped for. EU and NATO policy toward an enlarged Europe's new neighborhood needs to be rethought. And the United States and Europe need to get their act together on energy policy. With leadership changes coming up in Paris, London and Washington, the time is ripe to get out our laptops and debate the framework for a new policy.
Historically, there is no area where the United States and Europe have worked more closely and accomplished more historically - both during the Cold War as well as in the 1990s. Americans and Germans do often have different policy impulses. Americans have traditionally been more committed to democratic transformation -- in part because we are more powerful, more distant and have a different foreign policy ethos. Germany - weaker, closer, more dependent on Russian energy and burdened by history - errs on the side of stability. But if we can't bridge differences like these, what can we do together?

The end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a relevant consideration for many states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective.