Posted by Joerg Wolf in
European Issues, Transatlantic Relations on Thursday, February 25. 2010
While the Dutch government broke up over the war in Afghanistan, the Danish establishment seems to be very unified and serves as "an unlikely example of how to maintain public support for the war" writes the Wall Street Journal (HT: Atlantic Community):
"The key to sustaining public support is an elite consensus that includes politicians in government and opposition as well as key opinion leaders: influential intellectuals, academics and columnists," says Dr. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, a security expert at the University of Copenhagen. (.)
Mr. Gade, a former Danish army officer [who has led Danish efforts to maintain public support], said a key to winning the public was giving reporters deep access to soldiers, who were allowed to talk. When troops say, " 'We did a job and we did it good, and it is worth doing,' then it is very hard indeed for a lot of people to oppose, because those are the men and women who risk their lives," he said.
The article, however, also points out that recently there have been cracks in the coalition and a fall in opinion polls, with, for instance, a major newspaper withdrawing its support.
Posted by Nanne Zwagerman in
European Issues on Saturday, February 20. 2010
It is a rather late stage in the game for the war effort in Afghanistan to claim its first political victim. But yesterday night the Dutch governing coalition broke up over the question of extending its mandate. And that less than a week after narrowly surviving a debate over the (purely symbolic) support for the war in Iraq back in 2003. The political process has its own pace in the Netherlands.
The Guardian has a quote:
"A plan was agreed to when our soldiers went to Afghanistan," said the Labour leader, Wouter Bos. "Our partners in the government didn't want to stick to that plan, and on the basis of their refusal we have decided to resign from this government." Bos is pretending that the Dutch did their turn and will now have accomplished a virtuous task when they go home. His coalition partners, in turn, are pretending that their plans and conditions were ever intended to have consequences. The political process has its own rationality in the Netherlands.
Posted by Kyle Atwell in
European Issues, Transatlantic Relations on Friday, February 19. 2010
Ukraine's President-elect Viktor Yanukovych writes in the Wall Street Journal that “Ukraine Will Be a Bridge Between East and West”:
Let me say here, a Yanukovych presidency is committed to the integration of European values in Ukraine. Ukraine should make use of its geopolitical advantages and become a bridge between Russia and the West. Developing a good relationship with the West and bridging the gap to Russia will help Ukraine. We should not be forced to make the false choice between the benefits of the East and those of the West. As president I will endeavor to build a bridge between both, not a one-way street in either direction. We are a nation with a European identity, but we have historic cultural and economic ties to Russia as well. The re-establishment of relations with the Russian Federation is consistent with our European ambitions. We will rebuild relations with Moscow as a strategic economic partner. There is no reason that good relations with all of our neighbors cannot be achieved.
Can Yanukovych bridge the gap between East and West? Will he even try, or is this article simply political posturing to console those concerned about his pro-Russia stance?
Yanukovych was the most pro-Russia candidate, and has quickly sought to improve ties with Russia; he already suggested the Russian Black Sea Fleet may stay in Ukrainian waters and made clear Ukraine will not seek NATO membership. Ukraine will however continue moving toward EU membership (Businessweek).
His rival in the campaign and a leader of the 2004 western-supported Orange Revolution, Yulia Tymoshenko refuses to concede, and has requested the high court in Ukraine overturn the election results – an outcome seen as highly unlikely.
President Obama, the EU and NATO have already sent congratulations to Yanukovych.
With Yanukovych ditching NATO and seeking to improve ties to Russia and EU membership, the United States is the biggest loser from Yanukovych’s election. This outcome should not come as a surprise however: popular support in Ukraine for NATO membership has been consistently at or below 30 percent over the past few years, making NATO membership never really likely anyhow (AR forecasted this here).
With NATO membership for Ukraine never likely anyhow, perhaps the US has not lost much. In fact, Ukraine relations with the West under Yanukovych may not be much different than it has been under the Orange Revolution leadership for a few reasons:
* Ukraine will likely continue to develop a partnership with NATO, though not membership;
* Ukraine will want pragmatic and productive relations with the United States, and still seeks EU membership;
* The acceptance by international observers of Yanukovych's election and his intent to pursue EU membership both support the fact that while the Orange Revolution leadership has been voted out, the western values it respresented - a democratic and free society - are now embedded into Ukraine.
Whether or not Yanukovich can balance between the West and Russia is tough to predict. However, Yanukovich's intent to pursue this balance is likely a genuine aspiration.
Posted by Joerg Wolf in
European Issues, Transatlantic Relations on Wednesday, February 3. 2010
Reuters reported yesterday:
The European Union and the United States are likely to scrap plans to hold a summit in Madrid in May because U.S. President Barack Obama has decided not to attend, EU diplomats said on Tuesday.
Oh, that will make many in Europe's political class angry. Summits are so important to them, especially the "family photo" is considered of vital importance to national security.
An unsentimental President Obama has already lost patience with a Europe lacking coherence and purpose, opined Nick Witney and Jeremy Shapiro with the European Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution respectively in November 2009. Apparently, last year's EU-US summit in Prague, "at which President Obama was subjected to 27 interventions from the EU's assembled heads of state and government was an eye-opener for his administration."
Witney and Shapiro argued in Towards a post-American Europe: A Power Audit of EU-US Relations:
The US needs strong partners in a world that it no longer dominates. It knows it can turn to China on the economy and Russia on nuclear disarmament. In comparison, Washington is disappointed with Europe and sees EU member states as infantile: responsibility shirking and attention seeking.
The US would prefer a more united EU, but expects so little that it cannot bring itself to greatly care. When the EU is hard-headed, as with trade negotiations, the US listens. When it is not, Europeans are asking to be divided and ruled.
Will Europeans soon miss President George W. Bush?
Related posts on Atlantic Review:
Merkel got back-rubs from Bush, but she gets only a cold shoulder from Obama
President Obama and Europe
"Europeans Mourn End of Bush's Presidency"
Bush's Farewell Tour: Looking Ahead and Missing the Favorite "Punching Bag"
Posted by Joerg Wolf in
European Issues, Transatlantic Relations on Monday, December 21. 2009
Richard Gowan of New York University and the Global Dashboard blog, has some wise remarks on Afghanistan in The Indian National Interest Review:
The quality of strategic debate on Afghan affairs in EU capitals is far lower than that in Washington. "We ask what pulling out of Afghanistan would mean for the transatlantic alliance," one respected French strategist admits, "but not what it'd do to Afghanistan."
He could go further. Although European commentators are typically well-informed about Pakistan's instability, they rarely put "AfPak" in a wider strategic regional context. How would a NATO failure in Afghanistan affect relations between China and India? What impact would it have on Russia's Central Asian ambitions, or Iran's defiance of the West? These are not questions you are likely to hear seriously discussed in Europe. (.)
European analysts who see Afghanistan in transatlantic terms ("What does this do to NATO?") are in denial on this point. The future of Afghanistan is clearly of far greater significance to the triangular strategic relationship between China, India and the United States than it is to European affairs. But no-one likes to admit they are a second-order issue.
I agree. I think it is a big problem, that Europeans view so many foreign policy issues in regard to its effects on Europe's relationship with the big brother/uncle/cousins on the other side of the Atlantic.
Endnote: Check out on this topic: Towards a post-American Europe: A Power Audit of EU-US Relations. No more special relationships: Europe is wasting its "Obama Moment"
Posted by Nanne Zwagerman in
European Issues, Transatlantic Relations on Monday, November 23. 2009
A few weeks ago, Poland's defense minister made the following appeal, reported in the Telegraph:Radek Sikorski, Poland's foreign minister, said he was alarmed by recent military exercises conducted by the Russian army in Belarus, a country that borders Poland, and wanted the US military as a counterweight.
"We would like to see US troops stationed in Poland to serve as a shield against Russian aggression," he said.
"If you can still afford it, we need some strategic reassurance." It is hard to see why Sikorski would be so deeply worried by a military exercise featuring 900 tanks when Poland itself has more than that at hand. In an interview for Czech television, Zbigniew Brzezinski told East Europeans to grow up: East Europeans should stop behave like small children, start to deal with their own problems by themselves and not to go to the United States complaining about Russian aggressiveness, for instance, Zbigniew Brzezinski said in in interview for the public Czech Television Countries like Poland and the Czech Republic should be able to take care of their own - conventional - defence concerns to a large extent. Especially if they cooperate. They are both richer than Russia per head, they're not too small, and they have access to superior conventional technology. Meanwhile, the SIPRI database shows that Poland spent 2% of its GDP per year on defence in 2007, and the Czech Republic 1.4%. This compares to 3.5% for Russia and 4% for the United States.
(via, and via)
Posted by Nanne Zwagerman in
European Issues on Friday, November 20. 2009
The New York Times writes about the two new (or upgraded) posts that were filled in for the European Union yesterday: Leaders of the 27 countries of the European Union on Thursday night chose Herman Van Rompuy, the Belgian prime minister, as the European Union’s first president, and Catherine Ashton of Britain, currently the bloc’s trade commissioner, as its high representative for foreign policy. The vote was unanimous.
Both officials are highly respected but little known outside their own countries. After the European Union’s eight-year battle to rewrite its internal rules and to pass the Lisbon Treaty that created these two new jobs, the selection of such low-profile figures seemed to highlight Europe’s problems instead of its readiness to take a more united and forceful place in world affairs. The eurosceptic British newspaper The Telegraph noted the following press reactions: Spain's El Pais said the EU will be "led by two dull and low-profile figures."
Germany's Frankfurter Rundschau claimed the 27-nation bloc will be represented by "leaders with no sparkle, without a vision and even without experience in the required fields".
France's Liberation newspaper noted that EU leaders had rejected candidates from the bloc's newest members in eastern Europe but had at least chosen a woman to fill one of the posts. Neither the American nor the British press have much grasp of what these posts entail or how the EU works in general. To be fair, it can be complicated. But the British media have vastly exaggerated the importance of the President of the European Council, and to a lesser extent, also of the High Representative. The way these posts are written down in the Treaties mean they are little more than a chairman and a souped-up envoy for the Member States. So what we have is European Union in choosing competent, low-key people for senior posts shocker.
Obviously, this means that Europe is doomed. (hat-tip to Joerg for forwarding these articles)
Posted by Nanne Zwagerman in
European Issues, German Politics, Transatlantic Relations on Monday, November 16. 2009
An agreement negotiated between the US and the EU on sharing bank data in the context of antiterrorism has just been blocked by Germany, France, Finland and Austria. This shift in German policy signals general political changes that will continue to impact transatlantic relations.
- Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, German Minister of Justice, has a strong socially liberal profile. She had the same post in a CDU/CSU-FDP coalition in the '90s and resigned when her party agreed to far-reaching surveillance measures, eventually turning to bring a case before Germany's constitutional court that overturned much of the legislation.
- This move has happened in the EU at the ambassador level of the Council, in anticipation of a decision that would have been taken on November 30th. That is, one day ahead of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which will give the European Parliament the power to vote on this matter. The European Parliament, which wants to add significant protections or indefinitely shelve this agreement, was outraged by these plans. This procedural concern was also noted by Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger.
Changes in Germany's coalition following the victory of the CDU/CSU and FDP have resulted in a more liberal profile on internal security matters.
Continue reading "Germany Blocks EU-US Bank Data Agreement"
Posted by Nanne Zwagerman in
European Issues on Sunday, October 4. 2009
Now that Ireland has approved of the Lisbon Treaty by referendum and will soon have ratified, the immediate attention is going to be on the presidents of Poland and the Czech Republic. However, even eurosceptic blogger and UK Indepence Party spokesperson Gawain Towler does not see a prospect of the treaty being delayed long enough for a future Tory government to put it to a referendum.
This does not necessarily mean that independence has become impossible under the new European 'superstate' - as the sceptics would characterise the amended institutional structure. Our commenter John in Michigan points out that the treaty arranges for a procedure to let Member States exit the Union. There was no previous arrangement for such matters, which does not mean that leaving the Union was impossible, just that it would have to be sorted out under the very unclear rules of customary international law.
European defence policy and European foreign policy should be the main fields that benefit from Lisbon. In European defence policy, it will become possible to go ahead with integration in a smaller group if some states do not want to go along. The foreign policy of the European Union has previously been largely reducible to 'enlargement'. One thing the EU lacked was a professional diplomatic service. Another problem was the continuing wide divergence of perceived interests between Member States. Given that foreign policy will continue to be conducted by unanimity, the question whether a coherent policy will emerge - and how soon and for which reasons - will be a nice test of foreign policy doctrines.
Posted by Nanne Zwagerman in
European Issues, US Foreign Policy on Thursday, October 1. 2009
 Over a year after the fact, that is the central conclusion of a report commissioned by the Council of the European Union, which was released today. To a fair amount of international attention. The BBC has a write-up, including a pdf of the report. And even the Wall Street Journal, which has published a fair amount of columns by the Georgian President Saakashvili, had a headline that reads 'Report: Georgia Triggered War With Russia' (via Jerome).
The report itself is readable, and contains a useful timeline of the events. It is also critical of Russia, which is found to have reacted disproportionally to the attacks. In fact, no one comes away well from the report. It even ventures into some muted criticism of the support for the buildup of the Georgian army by the United States, which it calls a 'sensitive issue', while calling for such military support to 'stay within the boundaries set by common sense and due diligence'.
But, wait a second, no one? Well, there is one French President...After five days of fighting, a ceasefire agreement was negotiated on 12 August 2008 between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, the latter acting on behalf of the European Union. An implementation agreement followed on 8 September 2008, again largely due to the persistent efforts of the French President. This successful political action stood in contrast to the failure of the international community, including the UN Security Council, to act swiftly and resolutely enough in order to control the ever-mounting tensions prior the outbreak of armed conflict. That is actually clear language.
Continue reading "Georgia Started the South Ossetia War"
Posted by Editors in
European Issues on Thursday, September 17. 2009
This is a guest post from Andrew Zvirzdin. Originally from upstate New York, Andrew is currently finishing his second year of grad school at the Maxwell School in Syracuse.
The world has started to pay closer attention to Ukraine and it shows. Since the gas crisis in January of this year and the staggering decline of the Ukrainian economy through the first half of the year, officials in Europe and the US have worked in close collaboration with and for Ukraine. The support and attention (along with an improving global economy) has helped Ukraine avoid the calamitous economic fate I previously feared. But the real questions surrounding the country’s political identity remain.
Nearly all recent news in Ukraine seems positive. The EU announced last month that it had cobbled together a group of international banks willing to lend Ukraine $3.6 billion to buy gas in the near term. Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko further announced that all outstanding gas disputes have been resolved after meeting with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on September 1. And industrial production and steel exports are starting to climb higher. With money in their pockets, gas in the tank, and happier neighbors, Ukraine appears ready to reemerge as a strong regional player.
But underneath the surface, Ukraine remains severely divided by its two big neighbors and its two executives. Pro-west President Viktor Yuschenko continues to speak glowingly of Ukraine’s western neighbors, claiming that Ukraine would soon sign an Association Agreement with the EU. Prime Minister Tymoshenko meanwhile has appeared to grow closer to Russia in recent months, culminating with her praise of Prime Minister Putin at the September summit. The Ukrainian population appears as divided as their leaders; forging closer relations with Russia and the West are both distasteful options for a majority.
So who really speaks for Ukraine? And if there were such a person, what would they say? Hopefully, this will become clearer following the presidential elections to be held on January 17, 2010. But until then, political confusion threatens to undermine any new economic security. The EU has stipulated a number of reforms as a condition for the loans, including fighting corruption while raising the heavily-subsidized price of gas for Ukrainians. It is not at all certain that the politicians are up to the task. Institutional reform—to explicitly delineate executive power —is even more needed and less likely. The end result is that Ukraine will remain confused and unsure of which direction to face for some time to come. As temperatures start to fall, that prospect will surely cause some Europeans to shiver.
Posted by Joerg Wolf in
European Issues, German Politics, Transatlantic Relations on Thursday, April 30. 2009
On May 1, 2009, ten countries celebrate their fifth birthday as EU members, but eight of them don't get a birthday present from Germany. Berlin announced this week that it was keeping labor restrictions on workers from European countries. The Economist concludes: "As Germany becomes 'normal,' it looks a bit more national and a bit less European."
The true turning-point for Germany was 1998, he says, when Gerhard Schröder defeated the CDUs Helmut Kohl for the chancellorship. During his campaign, Mr Schröder accused Mr Kohl of putting European interests ahead of German ones. He had a point: Mr Kohl pushed through the single currency even though most German voters opposed it, and nasty EU rows about money usually ended with Mr Kohl pulling out Germanys chequebook. Mr Schröder was less community-minded, happy to shout, Germany is not paying for this one, at summits. It was under Mr Schröder that Germany began its quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, after years of seeking a single place for the EU. Today the picture is mixed. Ms Merkel is less impatient at EU summits than Mr Schröder. But, unlike Mr Kohl, she brings no retinue of smaller countries as allies to every meeting. And despite the recent display of Franco-German unity at the G20 gathering in London, she neither trusts nor likes Frances Nicolas Sarkozy.
German security and defense policy has become more "normal" as well, and every politician will note the huge changes at the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall later in November this year. But: There are still so many shortcomings and so little strategic thinking, at least publicly.
BTW: Last night, the Atlantic Council of the United States has awarded George H.W. Bush and Helmut Kohl the Distinguished International Leader Award in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and their role in ensuring the Cold War ended peacefully. That was quite an achievement, which too many people seem to take for granted this days, although so much could have gone wrong. Kohl's strategic thinking as well as his "chequebook diplomacy" and "community-mindedness" -- to use two terms from the Economist article -- paid off.
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