Posted by Kyle Atwell in
Transatlantic Relations, US Foreign Policy on Monday, January 28. 2008
The short-lived age of US hegemony is over, with no hope of return. Instead of comfortable primacy, the United States will struggle as one of three global superpowers.
This is the 21st century described by Parag Khanna in an essay published in New York Times Magazine, titled “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony” (HT: David Vickrey). Khanna, a Senior Research Fellow at the New America Foundation, bases the essay on his new book, “The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order,” to be published by Random House in March (the book is already the second bestseller at Amazon). Here is Khanna’s line of argument:
1) US hegemony is gone, for good:
Indeed, improvements to America’s image may or may not occur [with a new US president], but either way, they mean little. America’s unipolar moment has inspired diplomatic and financial countermovements to block American bullying and construct an alternate world order. That new global order has arrived, and there is precious little Clinton or McCain or Obama could do to resist its growth.
2) The 21st century will be run by the Big Three: the US, EU, and China:
This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big Three. Not Russia, an increasingly depopulated expanse run by Gazprom.gov; not an incoherent Islam embroiled in internal wars; and not India, lagging decades behind China in both development and strategic appetite. The Big Three make the rules — their own rules — without any one of them dominating.
3) The countries who determine the new balance of power will be the ones Khanna refers to as “second world,” “swing states," and “prizes” interchangeably:
Lying alongside and between the Big Three, second-world countries are the swing states that will determine which of the superpowers has the upper hand for the next generation of geopolitics.
Khanna’s thesis is sure to stir quite a bit of debate. Perhaps the biggest question is the most fundamental: has Khanna accurately identified the 21st century superpowers? Matt Dupuis speculates at Foreign Policy Watch:
He does overstate the case of the EU as a unitary actor a bit and neglects the extent to which US favor and leadership is still sought. And interestingly, he all but downplays the significance of India in a new world. But on the regional integration breaking ground in Southeast and East Asia and continuing in Europe (that more or less sidesteps the US) and the gradual irrelevance of the post-WWII order, the impact of this is well developed in the piece.
True, the EU has not been an impressive unitary actor. Its ability to do so depends largely on whether or not it consolidates and streamlines its foreign policy decision-making process… ratification of the Lisbon Treaty would be a positive step in this regard.
Interestingly, Khanna does not think the EU needs military power to be a global player on par with the US:
It may comfort American conservatives to point out that Europe still lacks a common army; the only problem is that it doesn’t really need one… Europe’s influence grows at America’s expense. While America fumbles at nation-building, Europe spends its money and political capital on locking peripheral countries into its orbit.
There are a couple problems with Khanna’s view of transatlantic relations:
First, fumbling at nation building is just as much a European activity as it is an American one. Several European countries are involved in or are leading major nation building projects – in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, etc. If anything, a more powerful and centralized EU would benefit the United States because it could contribute more effectively to these operations. Instead, the US is working with a hodge-podge of allies, each with varying levels of commitment and each demanding their own say at the table. What a pain.
Furthermore, Europe “locking peripheral countries into its orbit” does not hurt the United States. If anything, the higher human rights and rule of law standards required to join the EU makes these countries more stable, and therefore better strategic and economic partners for the United States.
Overall, Khanna has described a zero-sum relationship between the United States and Europe that is overstated.
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