The election of new "pro-American" leaders in Europe will not lead to closer and better transatlantic cooperation. Shared values are not enough. Different interests (often based on geographic location) limit the future strength of transatlantic relations.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Editor of The National Interest, in an interview with the Atlantic Community (full disclosure: my day job):

Shared values are an insufficient basis for partnership without compelling shared interests. European states do not have a strong and enduring relationship with like-minded democracies in the Asia-Pacific region, such as Japan or Australia, in the same way that they do with the United States, because Australia and Germany do not have overriding common economic or security interests. Moreover, even when Americans and Europeans agree on the issues, it does not mean that everyone reaches the same conclusions as to what policy is most effective. Other factors beyond shared values, including geographic proximity, can change a country's assessment. Germanys decision to continue to engage Russia and deepen economic ties, or Frances outreach to Libya including new weapons sales fly in the face of American preferences for using isolation and pressure as the main tools to try and effect change. But then again, the United States does not share a neighborhood with these states.

Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, argues in the Financial Times (subscribers only) that "transatlantic cooperation will be less predictable and more selective:"

Alliances require predictability: of threat, outlook and obligations. But it is precisely this characteristic that is likely to be in short supply in a world defined by shifting threats, differing perceptions and societies with widely divergent readiness to maintain and use military force. The 21st-century world is far more dynamic and fluid than the relatively stable and predictable period of the cold war.
This is in no way meant to defend or advocate unilateralism. But it is a recognition that many in Europe disagree with some US objectives, with how the US goes about realising them, or both. As a result, the US often will be unable to count on the support of its traditional allies.
Also weakening Europe's centrality to US foreign policy is that its capacity for global intervention is diminishing, especially in the military field.

Robert Kagan, however, is more optimistic about transatlantic cooperation, or more specifically: cooperation between democracies. He sees a tendency towards solidarity among the world's autocracies as well as among the world's democracies. Summary of his arguments is available at "The World Divided Between Autocracy and Democracy" on Atlantic Community.