I'll mainly repeat what I stated the first time. There was no UN mandate for driving futher into Iraq and deposing Saddam. Nor was there any US resolution allowing for that action. Most US military leaders were stunned at how badly the Iraqi army fought or in the case of its air force not at all. They were hesitant on pursuing the retreating Republican Guards for fear of CW attacks and a defense in depth which were not prepared for except in the most cursory manner.

As to the current hostilities between the Sunnis and Shiites I think that changing the regime would have been better earlier owing to the feeling among Shiites today that the US left them at the mercy of Saddam and the Sunnis. Instead of having one area loyal to the US, Kurdistan, the same US actions in the south would have at least created a rum Shiite state that owed its existence and continued protection to the US>

Plus VP Cheney was profoundly moved by the events of 9/11 and has argued that the risk now was worth the effort. The US came to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, that the old way of dealing with Saddam hadn't worked and with sanctions weakening felt it was better to act now then later.

But by 2003 knowledge about the capabilities of the Iraqi army were better documented and the JCS conveyed to the Pres. and VP that they could be in Baghdad in less than 30 days with less than 60% of the troops from '91. And this time not having to let the Kuwaiti Army into Kuwait City first or keeping the Syrians and the Jordanians happy but not in harms way or dealing with multiple radio frequencies, different ammunition and tactical trainig. Though even then the executive and the military were surprised at how quickly the tactical and strategic situation went against the Iraqis. The famed Thunder Runs to the airport were not products of desperation but rather calculated confidence that the junior officers assessement of the situation was correct. Which was actually one of the lessons of '91 in training and trusting the junior officers to better make in the field decisions.

Who in the military has argued for partition? Many pundits have, O'Hanlon and Pollack and some have said this partition would be wise and others claim it might be inevitable but not desirable, William Kristol, Robert Kagan and David Brooks.

Plus I have absolutely no problem with saying not finishing off Saddam in '91 even without a UN mandate or the loss of many ineffectual allies was the mistake. So I could argue that VP Cheney might also have argued the same.