Posted by Joerg Wolf in
Transatlantic Relations on Saturday, November 25. 2006
"Having recently returned home after nearly four years as a New York Times correspondent in Europe, I am struck by how deeply divided the United States is on almost every other issue," writes Richard Bernstein in the International Herald Tribune (via: Kosmoblog): Here in Manhattan, the affairs of the world seem very close, and not just because the situation in Iraq is particularly nasty, or even because we seem so stuck there, with none of the three options currently under discussion - pulling out the troops, keeping the same number of troops, and pulling the troops out in pre-announced phases - seeming to promise a happy outcome. Unlike Europe, which largely stays free of such quagmires, Americans are fated to get into one every now and then. It is the cost of being a superpower, especially a superpower that has always seen intervention in the affairs of the rest of the world as a natural vocation. (...) The blue-state-red-state dichotomy is a real and enduring one, and it is reflected in fierce and angry polemics about matters like gay rights and abortion that, for the most part, were settled in Europe years ago. It is not wrong to see the United States as a place where, far more than in Europe, a lot of basic issues are up for grabs. Bernstein, however, concludes that the United States is a country divided on issues, but united on principles. Our reader Avi made a slightly similar comparison between Americans and Europeans:
Europeans currently prefer temporary, evolving, process-oriented solutions, believing that because complete solutions are impossible, they should not be attempted. Americans hope to at least approach complete solutions and so attempt them, recognizing that nothing succeeds fully. That seems to Europeans to be missionary, imperialistic, unrealistic, what have you, and they seek for explanations why the Americans would embrace such foolishness. At the moment, post-Christian Europe has decided that religious people must be bringing some sort of messianic hope that is deluding the Americans. Avi explained that he is not talking about all, but about 70% of Americans and 70% of Europeans. His full comment is here. Avi blogs at Assistant Village Idiot.
Personal opinion: I am not sure if there are such big differences between Americans and Europeans. Many Americans have been against the Iraq war and are against a military solution in the Iran dispute, just like Europeans. Presidents Bush senior and Clinton have pursued cautious foreign policies as well. Generalizations about nations are always problematic. If (!) Bernstein's and Avi's comparisons are correct, then I would explain them this way: A majority of Europeans is more cautious, hesitant or timid in foreign policy, because the European countries are much less powerful than the United States and because Europeans remember how many disasters they have caused in the past: Germany has started two world wars. Other European countries have learned from their colonialist past. The United States has a different history. Therefore many Americans might have more faith in "complete solutions," as Avi put it. Failure to bring freedom, democracy and security to Iraq and Afghanistan is likely to decrease support in the United States for international interventions and might lead to some more support for isolationism or at least to a more cautious, hesitant approach like in Europe. See the Atlantic Review's posts about Isolationism on the rise and about Victor David Hanson, who sees success in the Middle East, but worries about US isolationism.
There are, however, still some active Neocons, who advocate bold military moves, albeit not anymore regime change and democratization: "We must bomb Iran", because "diplomacy is doing nothing to stop the Iranian nuclear threat," writes Joshua Muravchik, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, in the Los Angeles Times (November 19, 2006): What should be the timing of such an attack? If we did it next year, that would give time for U.N. diplomacy to further reveal its bankruptcy yet would come before Iran will have a bomb in hand (and also before our own presidential campaign). In time, if Tehran persisted, we might have to do it again. He is wrong to blame communism for the rise of fascism and Nazism: Finally, wouldn't such a U.S. air attack on Iran inflame global anti-Americanism? Wouldn't Iran retaliate in Iraq or by terrorism? Yes, probably. That is the price we would pay. But the alternative is worse. After the Bolshevik takeover of Russia in 1917, a single member of Britain's Cabinet, Winston Churchill, appealed for robust military intervention to crush the new regime. His colleagues weighed the costs -- the loss of soldiers, international derision, revenge by Lenin -- and rejected the idea. The costs were avoided, and instead the world was subjected to the greatest man-made calamities ever. Communism itself was to claim perhaps 100 million lives, and it also gave rise to fascism and Nazism, leading to World War II. Ahmadinejad wants to be the new Lenin. Force is the only thing that can stop him.
"Washington has a long habit of painting its enemies 10 feet tall -- and crazy:" is Fareed Zakaria quoted in the related Atlantic Review post About Terrorism and Security Policy Debates in Germany and the United States. Though some people do not consider the past policies under Bush senior and Clinton to be "cautious," but dangerous and responsible for the rise of terrorism and WMD proliferation. They want to be cautious and deal with potential future threats before they get too big. The problem with pre-emption, however, is that it could make the threats bigger rather than smaller, like the Iraq war did.
The Foreign Policy Magazine blog writes about the views of democratization expert Larry Diamond: Diamond is under no illusions about what the Iranian regime is up to, describing their current activities as an "obvious, frenetic pursuit of nuclear weapons." But he is surprisingly optimistic about the prospects for reform in Iran; arguing that there’s a "good probability" that we might see a democratic Iran within the next ten years or so. He believes that if "if we bomb [reform is] dead for a decade." But if we don’t, he sees real opportunities. He points out that, "Ahmadinejad is less effective and less politically potent internally than he may appear and the key to our strategy, in part, has to be to give him enough rope to hang himself."
Iran is still years away from building a nuclear bomb, so there is no need to bomb Iran now, which would just lead to another one of the quagmires Bernstein writes about, while not ending Iran's nuclear program, but strengthening the regime and reinforcing their determination to pursue nuclear weapons.
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