The most widely and intensely debated aspect of the present strategy is setting the date of drawndown of forces. By fixing an arbitrary time frame of summer of 2011, especially when the COIN strategy is just being unveiled, it runs the danger of working to the advantage to the propaganda of the insurgents and their sponsors. The Taliban have posted a message on the Voice of Jihad web page in response to the new strategy- "You send more troops, we'll have more to kill". Also, the limited time frame will help carry their narratives further in the Pushtun heartland “Americans have the watches; but we have the time”.

In the Indian context, the COIN campaigns are carried out over a large time frame under the liberal democratic constitutional framework where the state is ready to ‘bleed’ to let the insurgent groups engage the state through various dialogue mechanisms and in some cases even political representation. The successful end of the Mizo insurgency in India’s northeast is a case in point. In Afghanistan, the recently concluded presidential elections have only helped weaken the largely discredited Karzai government. The ‘credibility’ of the Afghan government is time and again raked both by the international community and the insurgents alike. Thus, in the absence of measures towards building a politically inclusive order that involves mechanism of conflict resolution and long-term reconciliation strategy, the dangers of subversion of the present weak Afghan regime at the end of 18 months only looms larger.

A major problem in outlining a time table for drawdown of troops hinges on the need for a phased transition to an Afghan-led security sector, to take over from the US forces in 18 months. If the objective is to increase ANA’s strength to 250,000 and that of the ANP to 150,000, as currently proposed by the Afghan government, there would remain the problems of mentoring and funding such a huge project. These numbers would be highly unsustainable for an externally aid dependent ‘rentier state’ whose annual budget is barely $2.5 billion. The greater worry, however, lies in the scenario of acceleration of training impinging on quality. Within the specified time frame and with the current level of funds earmarked, the US will not be able to create an army and police capable of independent action. It would alternately rely on the Urbaki (tribal militias) as it presently does in Wardak province. In the absence of clear security and political framework, these instruments of ‘community policing’ could only promote a culture of impunity. In India, the controversial role of the private militias in various conflict theatres has been a matter of intense public debate.

Although the setting of a date for draw down of forces after 18 months ends a lot of speculation regarding American intentions in that country, and has provided some clarity to the domestic constituency and allies, it has sent a wrong message to the ‘friends and foes’ in the region. It has evoked a lot of concerns particularly among the Afghans and Pakistanis.

In Pakistan, there are concerns that increase in troops will push tribal fighters along the Pak-Afghan border into Pakistani territory and create more instability. While partnership with Pakistan has been rightly highlighted, the difficult relationship on either side of the Durand Line coupled with weak civilian government’s lack of capacity to tackle the Afghan Taliban leadership based in Pakistani cities of Quetta and Karachi, there would be no significant blunting of the insurgent’s future capabilities. The strategy is largely silent on tackling the lethal capacities and inter-linkages of the local groups based in Pakistan and their connections with Al qaeda activities world wide.

India has supported the nascent democratic government by providing aid to various capacities building, education, health and infrastructure programmes. India’s US $ 1.2 billion investment in Afghanistan makes it the largest regional donor and sixth largest bilateral donor in the reconstruction of the war ravaged country. By investing considerably in building the human and economic capital base, India aims at helping Afghans stand on their feet. In building Afghan capacities, the Indian and US goals are in tandem but there are differences in the way the aid is delivered. Most of the international aid delivered through alternate delivery mechanisms has not helped build Afghan governments credibility and neither has it made much impact in rural areas of the South and East. While international aid has been flushed in insurgency afflicted areas, it has been not reached the people due to the insurgent’s capacity to choke the aid. India, on the other hand, has focused more on the north and west, to prevent these areas from sliding into instability.

President Obama’s message of ‘no blank cheques’ to the Afghans with a defined date of withdrawal has evoked lot of concerns. President Obama told the Afghans that their security is paramount, and that US is not an occupying force. However, he also said that US goal of destroying al Qaeda takes precedence. This mixed message, along with the signals that the US seeks to exit in 18 months, will be viewed closely by Afghan fence sitters who will make sure they are on the right side of a war that seems to have no end.

Dr. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza is Associate Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. shanthied@gmail.com