Friday, April 3. 2009
Posted by Nanne Zwagerman in
European Issues, Transatlantic Relations on Friday, April 3. 2009
That's what Daniel Korski notes in his latest ECFR policy brief. Factually, a lot of European countries have already sent more troops in Afghanistan, and still more are on the way there. Between November 2006 and March 2009, European troop levels increased by nearly 9,000, and European troops now make up nearly half of the ISAF mission. This has been the result of a set of (mostly) quiet revolutions in national policies on Afghanistan. At the same time, Europe still has not delivered a clear common strategy on Afghanistan, which is lamentable.
Korski makes some considered recommendations for an EU policy, which is very welcome, considering the lack of consideration on the official levels. At the same time, his ideas call for a critical review. Korski offers a list of seven policy recommendations, which are:
- A twin process of reconciliation with the Taliban and constitutional reform to be launched
- EU to field a large election observer mission and NATO to deploy the NATO Response Force for an election-focused boost to ISAF
- NATO allies to improve training of the Afghan army by setting up a Military Advisory Force, a Military Advisory Centre and launching a NATO training mission for non-basic army training
- EU to grow its police mission by hiring 500 officers on the open market, including from third states, like Ukraine, Moldova, Morocco, Serbia and Turkey, while reconciling the roles of the US CSTC-A and EUPOL
- EU states to support the establishment of a special UN-backed serious crimes tribunal, located in Kabul or elsewhere in the region, to take on drug kingpins
- US and EU to call for a new UN “assistance envoy” for Pakistan and to organise a donors’ conference
- EU to launch a “capital reconstruction team” for Kabul to guarantee a concerted focus on security and reconstruction
The notion of starting a tribunal for drug traffickers as a form of nation building is an innovative idea, and a temporary boost in troop numbers in the weeks leading up to the elections also sounds like a good plan that could bring real results as well as goodwill for an effort that is managable for Europe's militaries and can be sold to the domestic electorate.
Korski's suggestions on increasing the police mission and focusing more on gendarmerie-style police is perhaps growing to be a kind of conventional knowledge. At least, I also heard the exact same suggestions with regard to Iraq at a recent conference of the Boell Stiftung. Europe does have sufficient capacity for that on a national level, so going to the 'open market' is, well, a bit of free-marketese as dressing. Involving more countries is mainly helpful for the perception of legitimacy, and for general international cooperation, but it can also cause practical difficulties.
Where Korski and I differ is in his focus on the central government. Korski is sceptical of the American strategy to replicate their Anbar policy in Afghanistan. He notes that some European countries note difficulties in this regard, but it seems that the main European countries all support the basic idea of buying off local Pashtun power brokers by funding militias. In fact, Britain has long been trying to do so itself but has failed because of opposition from within the Afghan and the previous US government.
Another suggestion from Korski in this regard is to spend most of the aid money through the Afghan government, which is going to fall short on funds due to requirements for the nascent Afghan army. This, however, points to one of the few big gaps in the Obama administration's Afghanistan policy: we are setting up an Afghan national army which the country itself is not going to be able to pay for in the forseeable future. Directing funds through the national government also ignores the major issue of corruption within that government.
Most of the conditions in Afghanistan seem to speak for an approach of focusing on local capacities and keeping most funds for reconstruction under strict control. There are pitfalls to focusing on local government and also on local security, where it is needed in the form of militias. The (first) rise of the Taliban itself was facilitated with the population's and the international community's fatigue with feuding warlords, so we should be highly aware of the possiblity that we will fuel future conflicts.
There are a few things missing from Korski's piece that are on my wishlist, first and foremost the move to a single command under ISAF and a concomitant end to Operation Enduring Freedom (continuation of some of OEF activities could be done under a much smaller mission exclusively made up out of special forces). This is also part of the package of actions called for in a recent report of the Asia Society. That report is focused on US policy, but a single command (we already have a single commander by now, so it would not be a big organisational issue) should be especially in the interest of European NATO countries.
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