Cross-posted on Atlantic Community:

Dialog for the sake of dialog is meaningless. It substitutes process for substance. Dialog might be useful, if there is something to talk about.

But Mr. Rashid fails to address the critical question -- what do we (the West, NATO, Germany, US) have than the Iranians want? What do we have that they want, enough to give up either a nuclear bomb, or stop making trouble in Afghanistan, or both? Mr. Rashid does not answer this directly. Is he suggesting that merely making Iran a member in the various fora and institutions he mentions, is enough incentive for Iran? This is what he seems to be saying.

If so, he leaves out several important points.

First, US-Iranian dialog was going nowhere, until it became clear that the surge in Iraq was succeeding. We need similar progress in Afghanistan before engaging in dialog with the Iranians on that front. If Germany, the US, and indeed the rest of NATO could agree to implement a surge in Afghanistan (including vitally necessary reforms to the ISAF command structure and the end of most national caveats), in return for a US guarantee of future dialog with Iran on the topic of Iraq, that might make sense.

But I think Mr. Rashid is proposing simultaneous initiatives, which seem to me more likely to fail or be misinterpreted by Iran as a sign of weakness. Dialog can be a sign of strength, but it is hard to see how under the current circumstances, absent a successful Afghanistan surge. Still, if simultaneous dialog is the price to be paid to get Germany out of the barracks and engaged in Afghan the way Mr. Rashid clearly understands is needed, it might be worth it.

Second, when Iran and the US engaged somewhat on Iraq, Iran at the same time increased its misbehavior in other places, particularly Lebanon and Afghanistan. This shows that Iran still believes it gets equal, if not more, benefit from having the West as an enemy, than as a friend. It is negotiating re Iraq as a temporary tactic in support of a utopian (if not apocalyptic) "national greatness" strategy that is unaltered. Iran doesn't want to be invited to join the community of nations; it wants the community of nations to join Iran.

So we are back to the original question: What do we have to give, that will make Iran value us more as friends than as enemies? I don't know the answer; it seems to me we have plenty to give, but none of it of interest to the Iranians until they make a strategic decision to alter their current strategy. Mr. Rashid seems to think dialog alone is enough. But what do we say, that we haven't already said many times before?