I think it's a pity that Joel Brinkley doesn't elaborate much beyond belaboring the truism that "Europe and the United States, like it or not, remain deeply dependent on each other - no matter the issue, no matter who is president."

And it's a pity, because there's a lot more to dig up; for example, while it's true that there's an unmistakable reluctance in European capitals to "step up", let alone "take over" (for one, as the fringe benefits don't appear either clear or convincing) it's also true that there's an increasingly globalizing effect of European political and legal discourse, i.e. also in the US; the European Commission-borne antitrust case against Microsoft is just one interesting case in point, where a bark from Brussels (with the threat of a real bite) affects "business as usual". And that's completely aside from macro-technological growth as exemplified by Galileo, Jules Verne or the A380.

On the other hand, I can't hide my annoyance at the somewhat despondent tone that emanates from contemplating the shards of what used to be a fairly solidly underpinned popular trust in US leadership on the Eastern side of the Atlantic. I could engage on any number of rich angles here, but I'll just highlight a prominently featured one in Blinkley's article: Afghanistan. Anyone in the US harboring hopes of an increased European participation level in the military catastrophe that is Afghanistan on account of a non-Bush named resident in the WH is bound for some sever disabusing.

There are two very simple reasons that participation is, at best, tepid: one, the fairly broadly existing conviction throughout Europe that Iraq was such a colossal mistake that moving too close in alignment in Afghanistan only begs for much unappreciated collateral damage. Unless the US itself raises its presence there, and deals in a less duplicitous and more effectively manner with the remake of Faust in Pakistan, there's simply no "national interest" weighing in favor for a heightened and deepened participation in Afghanistan (and the trans-Caucasian region as a whole, by the by - unless foregoing "non-proliferation" is an acceptable trade-off for scoring some diplomatic brownie points abroad).

The second reason lies in a profound lack of trust among Europeans that a change of the guard in the WH will also necessarily imply a less Manichean approach to combating international terrorism. Taking cues from the Venezuela/FARC complex as an illuminating example, I don't foresee significant changes, other than signaled "predisposition", espoused "warmer relations", and declarations toward "a firm but shared commitment to achieving the same goals". I'll also just obliquely point to Kyoto, Bali and similar climate change related protocols, which have simply raised the bar too high for the US to catch up, e.g. given existing troubles on the economic front, after lost decades of foot dragging, kicking and screaming (and losing precious opportunities for the development of renewable resources and related technology).

In all, that's why Afghanistan will remain a lofty topic for forums like the one that inspired Brinkley's dull enumeration of the obvious, without much more to look forward to over the next (and at least the first) US President's term, than circumstantially inspired flirting and mouthing of "partnership" vernacular, particularly those European government leaders most in need of a foreign policy coup outside the EU. Let's make no mistake: much in the same way that Gordon Brown currently presents an attractive target for Sarkozy's orphaned affection at home, the whole Iraq malarkey can be attributed to the dangerous Geltungsdrang of a few overachievers in Europe: Blair, Aznar, and Berlusconi. Their memory has all but faded - less so the lessons that lie in the ruins of Iraq: a fatally flawed war can't be "sold" profitably on the merits of trans-Atlantic courtship alone.

Again, I can't stress the single most outstanding feature that outlives the optimism seemingly prevalent in the US about Europeans warming up to "a more sensible" President in the WH: deep-seated jadedness, or skepticism, or cynicism. They point in the same direction: Europeans don't by that hype trumps reality. They're reminded by the ever present tokens of their grim history, and not in the least by the still fresh memories of several massive, genocidal wars on their soil (with earth shattering consequences for the reconfiguration of the entire state model to boot)
and therefore any talk toward will somehow overpowering reality has an adverse ring to it.

In US vernacular: don't come with ideas of impressing with a new guy (or gal) in town. Show me the money.

I'll close here with such an example, a hidden sting that seemingly flew past Berkley, even while he offered it in a quote. I'll highlight the part in question, and leave it up to the reader to grasp the significance of nuance (yes, that infamously typical word of cheese eating surrendermonkeys):

Obviously I didn't present the predecessor of today's has-been as an absolute reference. But I'm curious why an at best mediocre chess player such as Nixon would ever deserve to be situated in the vicinity of the water President Eisenhower walked on.

Nixon and W have a lot in common, especially their condition as players, not masters of the game.

Managed to "prevent a civil war"? By stepping down you mean, surely? You can thank more sensible incarnations of Congress and the Supreme Court for that.

About the "intelligence" part, it was him believing he had it which was the fundamental cause for his downfall, leaving decades of turbulence and a revanchist Cheney in his wake.

Putting Eisenhower and that machiavellian mistake in the same sentence ought to be punishable offenses.

The circumstance that Watergate could "happen" isn't attributable to Nixon's bidding.

As to playing ye olde divide and conquer, the enemey of my enemy being a circumstantial ally, I don't think that's a token of particular intelligence, either: just a pragmatic Realpolitiker. As much as he was a smart aleck, him buying into his being "clever" is what imperiled the Presidency - for that reason alone he should be locked near the bottom of the list of worthy memorable presidents.

Henry Kissinger is a far more interesting figure, I believe.

Yup, Allan Dulles' translator traveled far.